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1997; May, 1977) . As Frankl (1978) so aptly pointed out, a firm sense of meaning is essential for optimal human development. Bruner (1990) put it more bluntly, noting that without meaning systems "we would be lost in a murk of chaotic experience and probably would not have survived as a species in any case" (p. 56).
In light of the importance-indeed, necessity-of meaning systems for human functioning, one of the goals of psychotherapy is helping trauma victims restore meaning in their lives (Foy, 1992; Herman, 1992) . Recent research on "posttraumatic growth" also points to the crucial role renewed meaning plays in the healing process (Decker, 1993a (Decker, , 1993b Jaffe, 1985; Seibert, 1996 Seibert, , 2002 Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998) .
What is not clearly understood, however, are the modes of thinking trauma victims use in the process of restoring meaning in their lives. In other words, what cognitive processes undergird the transition from a life devoid of meaning to a life enriched with meaning and therefore newly worth living? The relatively young but rapidly growing field of cognitive science has shown the value of identifying various thinking processes for shedding light on complex psychological and social phenomena (Searle, 2002; Turner, 2001 ). Thus far, however, a cognitive science perspective has not been used to examine the modes of thought employed in posttrauma meaning restoration.
My purpose here is to fill this gap by presenting a model of modes of thought, or what Turner (2001) called "mental operations," entailed in meaning making in the aftermath of trauma. Briefly, the model is composed of three cognitive processes: (a) metaphor construction, (b) "worldmaking" (Goodman, 1978) , and (c) developing contexts of action. Focusing on how people think is of great importance to humanistic psychology, because cognition is a window to understanding how people make sense of experience (the purpose and meaning of life) and perceive challenges and opportunities for future action.
To illustrate my model in action, I will discuss two case studies, each one depicting a trauma sufferer in the midst of meaning restoration. In the first, SW is a jazz musician who is diagnosed with a disease that threatens his career. In the second, MR, a physician, endures several traumas, including breast cancer, that hamper her ability to continue working under the constraints of managed care. On one hand, the particularities of each participant's life results in idiosyncratic paths to meaning restoration, whereas on the other, the two cases reveal the same underlying cognitive processes at play. I conclude with a framework for integrating the particular and the general.
DEFINING TERMS

Meaning
My definition of meaning in professional life has significant overlap with Isaksen's (2000) framework, which states that "meaning in work concerns the reasons an individual has for working, what he or she seeks to accomplish by working, and the continuity that he or she experiences in work" (p. 87). He went on to add that meaning "is an individual state of mind that occurs when an individual regards the relationship between him-or herself and his or her [work] context as satisfactory in some individually important way" (Isaksen, 2000, p. 93) . For the two cases I discuss below, meaning ultimately obtains because of a perceived "fit" between deeply held personal views of life (McAdams, 1993) and the core values of the professional contexts in which they work. To a great extent, personal views of life and core professional values merge and become indistinguishable for meaning to be restored in one's professional life.
Metaphor
Metaphor refers to the use of images or ideas from one domain of experience (real or imagined) to explain, describe, or make sense of another domain of experience (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) . There are two types of metaphors SW and MR use for conceptualizing possible new meanings in their professional lives: primary metaphors and complex metaphors. Primary metaphors stem from actual primal bodily experience. For example, when a person describes being angry by using the metaphor, "You make my blood boil," he or she draws upon the experience of increasing body temperature that accompanies anger (Lakoff, 1987) . Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 50-54) detailed a lengthy list of other common primary metaphors.
Complex metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) often build upon primary metaphors (albeit loosely at times) and are pervasive within a culture, but in the end, they are not necessarily drawn from the known experiences of those who use or hear them. For example, when MR refers to her medical education as a prison, one need not have spent any time in a prison to understand what she is trying to convey.
Worldmaking
Worldmaking is the process of viewing, experiencing, and understanding life from new and different angles. Goodman (1978) made the important point that "worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds already on hand; the making is the remaking" (p. 6). Although metaphor goes hand in hand with conceptualizing new meaning, it is worldmaking that sets in motion an actual cognitive process of development. Worldmaking, in essence, is the "engine" that leads SW and MR to generate metaphorically based meanings. I discuss several "ways of worldmaking" detailed by Goodman that are applicable to the two case studies.
Contexts of Action
The use of metaphors and worldmaking are not mere abstract cognitive processes. People must be able to envision, and ultimately act within, actual contexts to restore meaning in their professional lives. That is, metaphor and worldmaking ultimately must occur in real, lived situations. At the same time, however, imagining and acting within specific contexts is itself the result of a complex cognitive process, which I describe below.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The following is a graphic representation of how metaphor, worldmaking, and context of action impinge on meaning making (see Figure 1) .
The double arrows between each of these three elements signify their interdependence. In other words, SW and MR do not employ metaphor, worldmaking, and context of action in a discrete, isolated manner but, instead, draw upon them simultaneously. Furthermore, each one of these cognitive processes entails elements of the other two. So, for example, worldmaking involves metaphorical thought and vice versa.
When links between the three parts of the model are established in SW and MR's minds, and when elements of each part are integrated into the others, pathways to renewed meaning are established. As I noted above, though, SW and MR are in the process of restoring meaning in their professional lives, which suggests that the cognitive components of my model must be enacted repeatedly over time before a "final" sense of meaning (for the time being, that is) is developed. Furthermore, the new meanings that SW and MR generate regarding their professional "selves" ultimately influence how they think.
METHODS
The two case studies I examine come from a much larger ongoing study called the Good Work Project. work that is at once high in quality and socially responsible. The Good Work Project does not explicitly focus on questions of trauma and meaning restoration. However, because our interview protocol is semistructured, there is considerable opportunity for participants to address questions in an idiosyncratic and expansive manner. This was the case for SW and MR, both of whom talked a great deal about trauma in their lives in response to questions about the challenges and opportunities for carrying out good work. Their interviews lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours, and, like all interviews from the Good Work Project, were transcribed.
Analysis proceeded by multiple and careful readings of SW and MR's transcripts with particular attention to the dynamics of language use. I identified two levels of patterns that emerged from the data: (a) general conceptual ideas (e.g., metaphorical thought) and (b) specific examples of how general concepts play out within the particulars of SW and MR's lives. This strategy of analysis comes, in large part, from scholarship on discourse analysis, especially the work of Goodwin (1990) .
CASE STUDIES
First Case: SW
SW is a 36-year-old African American jazz drummer who was just hitting his stride professionally when he was diagnosed with a chronic neurological disease that threatened to end his career as a musician. SW's disease, called dystonia, causes uncontrollable muscle contractions, otherwise known as "twitches." The disease has primarily affected SW's fingers on his dominant playing hand, resulting in lost ability to employ fine muscle control in his fingers. He has witnessed the slow but steady decrease in his ability to execute some of the most fundamental playing techniques he had developed through years of rigorous training. SW recounts how a formal diagnosis, which signaled a permanent condition, affected him at first:
That was a very stressful situation because at the time I was trying to support my family and everything, and my career was going very well at the time. I was doing a lot of high-profile concerts with very established jazz musicians . . . that I looked to all my life-people I wanted to play with my whole life. . . . It's probably the most stressful situation-one of the most stressful situations-I've been in in my life, because my whole career's on the line now. And my musical identity . . . everything is being affected by this condition.
In essence, the musical techniques that shaped how he conceptualized, approached, and related to his instrument and, by extension, music writ large, were no longer available to him. The meaning system he had constructed as a musician disintegrated. What, then, could music mean to him? How could he understand himself professionally? These are the questions SW faced in the aftermath of his diagnosis.
After a period of reflection, SW came to realize that music could once again hold meaning for him by shifting his perspective away from an emphasis on technique to a focus on what he calls playing from an "emotional response." Since this reconceptualization of professional purpose, SW reports deriving renewed meaning from his work.
Metaphor SW uses several metaphors to depict the idea of playing from an emotional response. I argue that these metaphors are not arbitrarily chosen by SW and, in fact, simultaneously stem from his bodily experience (primary metaphor) and common notions among jazz musicians about what it means to play jazz music. The central metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999 ) SW uses to describe playing emotionally, around which all other metaphors revolve, can be divided into three conceptual parts: (a) music itself resides deep within his being, meaning his body is like a container holding and sometimes trapping music; (b) music coexists in a physically experienced state with other feelings, such as sadness and anger, and is also bound up with such feelings; and (c) music needs to be freed (cut loose, let out) from the depth of his being so that it/he can convey his feelings. Let us look at an example of this "music-as-bodilyexperience" metaphor:
I'm trying to be more open minded in terms of allowing my musical influences to come out. . . . But any influence, if there's something that creatively comes to mind that I might have, might be an influence from a Stevie Wonder song . . . I'll let that come out, too. So, why limit it to certain idioms or eras or approaches? I'm trying to allow all my musical influences to come out any time, equally. . . . The thing that may portray the most emotion in the particular musical moment may not be the typical thing that I used to think of for that song. So it could be a Duke Ellington song, but emotionally, at the moment, it may have to be something I heard or was influenced by from a John Coltrane record or Gospel. I may have to play that to get the most emotion across at that moment.
This passage aptly illustrates the three aspects of SW's musicas-bodily-experience metaphor I limned above. First, he uses submetaphors to indicate the notion that music is contained deep within him. SW talks of being "open minded," in other words, creating a conduit so that his music can "come out" from his being. Second, SW pairs talk of music with emotions that reside within him. Music is something that "portrays the most emotion" or "gets the most emotion across." For SW, music and feeling are intimately tied together. Third, SW understands music as something that needs to be set free from the depths of his being. Music, for expression to occur, needs to "come out." Musical ideas "come to mind," as opposed to his arduously shaping them. In short, music exists as a force, a physically experienced entity, independent of actual musical performance.
What drives SW's use of the music-as-bodily-experience metaphor? Given the physical obstacles imposed by dystonia, SW had to find a means of conceptualizing his musicality in a manner not exclusively bound to a reliance on virtuoso-like technique. To have developed a professional goal dependent on technical mastery would have been a recipe for failure. In other words, SW's quest for restored meaning in his work is unavoidably bound by his actual physical condition. In turn, SW's lived experience directly influences his cognition-the use of primary metaphor-to conceptualize potential, new avenues to meaning in his work life.
At the same time, the central metaphor SW uses is one shared by many and perhaps most jazz musicians. Although the notion that music inheres within one's being and is tied to emotion is not unique to jazz, the concept of a spontaneous, unconscious release of a musical force is a common notion underlying improvisational jazz. SW reflects this ideal when he speaks of getting "the most emotion across at that moment" and portraying "the most emotion in the particular musical moment." Although technique certainly plays an important role in improvisation, most jazz musicians acknowledge that a technically adept but emotionally devoid improvisation misses the essence of the music.
What we are seeing here, then, is a convergence between a central metaphor generated from SW's lived experience, on one hand, and profession-wide values, on the other. Why the melding of the personal and the professional? If one's values are at odds with a profession, it is unlikely one will attain success and experience the states of "flow" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990 ) so often essential for attaining quality of experience (which, in turn, is important for constructing meaning). Whereas Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, and Damon (2001) discussed the necessity for "alignment" between a profession's values and its corresponding population of professionals, what we are seeing in the case of SW is the need for alignment on an individual level.
As I suggested earlier, SW's central metaphor is conceptually buttressed by supporting metaphors that contribute to his ability to think about pathways to new meanings in his work. One such metaphor is his linking playing more emotionally to the approach and disposition of a beginning-level musician. As he explains, Kind of like a beginner who's never had a lesson, they just pick up drum sticks and they just play any old beat-whatever comes to their mind. And they're not impaired necessarily by thinking, [which] is stopping them from playing. Now, technically and maybe execution-wise it's very poor, but they're playing from a purely emotional standpoint. . . . They're just tapping their feet. We don't think about tapping our feet. We just tap our feet in time to the music, because that's what we're feeling.
The music-as-bodily-experience metaphor, as we saw, locates music in SW's physical being and as a force to be released. The "playing-like-a-beginner" metaphor builds upon and refines this idea by offering SW a means of conceptualizing how emotion can "come out." The beginner metaphor also supports SW's notionindeed, an ideal in jazz at large-that improvisation is an unconscious expression of deeply felt emotion. SW notes the desirability of not being impaired by "thinking," which he contrasts with his value of "playing from a purely emotional standpoint." SW's playing-like-a-beginner metaphor, like his music-asbodily-experience metaphor, is rooted in his physical limitations. In one segment of his interview, SW relates that dystonia has forced him to relearn his instrument because he has switched dom-inant playing hands to compensate for his disability. SW conceptualizes himself playing like a beginner because, by his own admission, he is starting over again. The metaphor is a positive one for him, though, because he conceptualizes beginner not just as one who lacks skill and experience but as one who has the ability to play emotionally. Once again, then, SW's lived experiencenamely, the limitations imposed by dystonia-provides the "raw material" for the metaphors he uses to envision paths to restored meaning in his professional life.
Worldmaking
What, then, are the steps SW takes to move from an understanding of music as built around technique to one defined by emotion? By what cognitive turns are new metaphorical "worlds" of possibility generated? It might appear from SW's metaphors alone that he has made a "clean break" from one world to another simply by deciding to substitute an emphasis on emotion for one based on technique. In fact, however, SW uses cognitive or worldmaking strategies to fashion new worlds from old ones.
One such strategy is what Goodman (1978) called weighting. Goodman explained weighting by example:
We might perhaps better say that . . . two worlds contain just the same classes sorted differently into relevant and irrelevant kinds. Some relevant kinds of the one world, rather than being absent from the other, are present as irrelevant kinds; some differences among worlds are not so much in entities comprised as in emphasis or accent, and these differences are no less consequential. (1978, pp. 10-11) It is important to note that weighting is not necessarily a conscious or one-time process. SW exemplifies this subtle process in his explanation of the shifts in weighting he accords the technical (world one) and the emotional (world two):
I'm trying to refine my technique to the point that, once I have the emotional response, the physical action is not impaired by lack of technical facility. So, in that sense I'm trying to become more technical. Because there's a point where technique prevents you from playing, period. Then you reach a point where technique allows you to play well, in a functional sense. But I'm trying to get beyond playing well to where my technique is refined to the point where it allows me to play subconsciously.
Despite his overall assessment that playing emotionally is the best route following his diagnosis, SW begins by giving weight to technique. He acknowledges the validity of technique as a cornerstone of musical competence. "Physical action," which for him is no longer a given, must "not be impaired by lack of technical facility." SW notes, however, that he is now at a point where he is more or less satisfied with his playing in a "functional sense" and is giving greater weight to playing "subconsciously" (meaning emotionally, spontaneously). Such newly accorded weight corresponds to a rich world of associated concepts including many we have already reviewed, such as music as a physical force in need of release.
The second worldmaking strategy SW uses is what Goodman (1978) called "composition and decomposition" (C/D). Goodman's description of C/D is as follows:
Much but by no means all worldmaking consists of taking apart and putting together, often conjointly: on the one hand, of dividing wholes into parts and partitioning kinds into subspecies, analyzing complexes into component features, drawing distinctions; on the other hand, of composing wholes and kinds out of parts and members and subclasses, combining features into complexes, and making connections. Such composition or decomposition is normally effected or assisted or consolidated by the application of labels: names, predicates, gestures, pictures, etc. (1978, pp. 7-8) In essence, what Goodman is describing here is a shifting or realignment of how one categorizes life. As Lakoff (1987) persuasively demonstrated, categorization is an important dimension of cognition, because it has to do with how people make sense of experience.
SW uses C/D to recategorize his self-concept as a musician following his diagnosis. He says, Every performance can become a good performance, because it's not based on the way you view yourself. Typically, as a musician, it's, "How well did I play the things that I normally play?" But if you get away from that realm and get into, "How well did I convey what I was trying to convey?" it makes your performances take on different light because your values in terms of judging what's successful and what's not are different. And I think that's why I'm enjoying music.
To a degree, this passage reflects SW's use of weighting, because he talks about shifting his emphasis, once again, from technique to emotion. Goodman (1978, pp. 16-17) acknowledged that worldmaking strategies are interdependent and conceptually linked and thus cannot be considered discrete categories. I have classified this particular example as C/D, however, because the more resonate theme of the passage has to do with a deep shift in SW's values concerning how he views himself, a standard against which to evaluate success or failure and a means for deriving pleasure from music. SW has "decomposed" his self-image as a technically adept musician and "composed" a new image of himself as one who conveys feelings. This conceptual shift, when combined with the example of weighting discussed above, accounts for the cognitive process SW undertakes to envision goals and values that ultimately lead to restored meaning in his work life.
Context of Action
As Bruner (1986 Bruner ( , 1990 pointed out, meaning arises in specific contexts and in our interactions with others. This principle is evident in the case of SW. For restored meaning to obtain, the "purely" cognitive strategies of metaphor and worldmaking must be acted upon in specific contexts.
As we have already seen, SW mentions two situations in which renewed meanings are enacted in his work: actual musical performances (in which he spontaneously expresses emotion) and the wider context of the domain of jazz music (and its value of playing emotionally). Both of these cases represent a combination of contextual focal points and the ideas of his fellow jazz musicians (notions of how music should be played).
There is a third context that plays an equally important role for SW: prayer. He comments that prayer: allows me to clear my mind [and] puts me more in touch with God and my spiritual side. So everything is leading to that, like technical studies, musical studies. Whatever I'm studying is so everything I do musically is purely spiritual. . . . There's nothing to hinder that flow. . . . If you're in touch spiritually, there's a wide range of emotions that come with that when you're in touch with really what you're feeling. I think that to be really in touch with your emotions, it has to come from a spiritual base.
Note that when talking about prayer as a path to emotion (and, in turn, emotionally based performance), SW uses part of the metaphorical framework we have already examined. He conveys accessing emotion as a "flow" that has the potential to be hindered, which is in line with his earlier description of music as an entity that needs to come out of one's being. It should perhaps not be surprising that some of the same metaphorical themes emerge again, because, as I have noted, metaphor, worldmaking, and context of action are interrelated and interdependent.
It is a (by now) commonplace notion that context is necessary for enacting meaning. When viewed from a cognitive science perspective, however, it is clear that a far more complex mode of thought undergirds the use of context for restoring meaning. The cognitive process known as "blending" refers to conceptually linking at least two previously unaffiliated phenomena, whether real or imagined. This conceptual blend then results in a wholly new (for the person doing the blending, that is) mental representation that was not available independent of the blend. The development of new schemas also leads to the generation of new meanings (Turner, 2001 ).
In the case of SW's use of prayer, a blend occurs as follows. SW conceptually links two previously unaffiliated phenomena: prayer and the notion of accessing deep emotion. The combination of this blend results in an altogether new representation that is interdependently linked to his metaphors and worldmaking: the concept of himself as a jazz musician who plays emotionally, not just technically. From the cognitive science perspective of blending, then, context can be understood as more than physical environment, people, or objects alone. Context of action comes to refer to a mental representation that SW uses prospectively (Turner, 2001 ) to conceptualize the deployment of restored meanings in his professional life.
Second Case: MR
MR is a 52-year-old female physician (an internist) who works in a busy group practice in a suburb adjacent to Boston. Before turning to the specifics of MR's case, it is first useful to set the stage by outlining some general differences between her and SW. As we have just seen, SW's path to meaning restoration can best be understood as follows. A precipitating trauma brings about a crisis of meaning, which, in turn, leads SW to develop, through the processes of worldmaking and envisioning various contexts of action, metaphors that encapsulate pathways to new meanings in his professional life. These processes are interrelated, but they are also characterized by a degree of linearity. That is, SW identifies "achievable" objectives for establishing renewed professional meaning (playing more emotionally) and takes a series of "cognitive steps" to do so. His very metaphors, especially those related to being on a path of development, suggest that SW is "future oriented" and has made significant progress in meeting his goals.
Although MR speaks of one trauma-breast cancer-that is most responsible for her professional meaning crisis (a conflict between her values and the values of managed care medicine), her illness can only be understood in the context of a series of other traumas and difficulties, some having originated in childhood (including the sudden death of a grandfather, being a female medical student when there were still relatively few women in the profession, and not being able to balance professional demands and parenting/family needs). A lifetime's worth of traumas not only frames but constrains how MR thinks about establishing renewed meaning in her life. Consequently, developing new metaphorsand restoring new meaning in general-is more challenging for MR, because she must first "wrestle" with preexisting metaphors concerning multiple traumas. Although there is no doubt that MR does initiate renewed meaning in her professional life, an important difference between her and SW is that she is more "past oriented." As such, her path to restored meaning is more circular than linear.
Metaphor
Each of MR's various traumas and difficulties has its own associated metaphors. For example, she refers to her divorce from her first husband as a "breakdown" in the relationship and her experience in medical school as a "prison" and like "Vietnam." At the same time, however, because MR defines herself in large part as a victim of multiple traumas, she has developed a central metaphor of sacrifice that stands for the sum total of her suffering, especially her professional-meaning crisis. This central metaphor, like many of SW's metaphors, is rooted in actual experience:
And when I was 8, my cat had half-demolished a bird on the sidewalk in front of our house, and the bird was still alive and was clearly not going to make it, you know, but I mean, it was perfectly obvious it was dying. And I decided it was suffering. So I stepped on it, with my little saddle oxford foot, which I can still see in my mind's eye, and it went, "Peeeep!"
And it was also during the time in the Catholic church where you're, you know I think it's right around maybe the year after my first communion and I started confessing, and so I had just tremendous worries about-I was sure it was the wrong thing to do. I was certain of it. And yet, seeing the bird suffer was also the wrong thing to do. And so I wasn't certain what I should have done, but I was certain that having stepped on it was the wrong thing to do.
And I don't remember whether I felt compelled to confess it-I probably did, I confessed telling jokes in those days because I thought it might actually be a kind of a lie. So I went through this period of being incredibly anxious and worried about whether I was doing the right thing. But this I was certain was the wrong thing. I don't remember the priest remarking, so it's possible I didn't confess it. But in any case, my penance was to become a physician.
MR's actual experience of stepping on a bird is transformed into a metaphor as a means of depicting her current professional difficulties. As she explains, I'm faced with this incredible dilemma. I'm contracted with insurance companies whose products I think have me in a position that is unequivocally a position of conflict of interest, where there's an incentive for me not to do certain things. The sound bite is, of course, that the incentive is to practice high-quality, cost-effective health care.
But the bottom line is that, if I don't fall into line with respect to certain behaviors, I might risk for being delisted, because there's a termination-at-will clause that all these companies have the doctors sign. And as a gatekeeper, I'm really an insurance agent. I'm unequivocally an employee of the insurance industry, to control cost.
So now I'm at this crossroads. Do I tell my patients I can't engage in these insurance products anymore because they're unethical? I can't be a part of this new philosophy of the distributive ethic in health care, which is that my responsibility is to the whole population of my patients, not just to one.
Should I order a spine MRI scan that I really don't think is necessary for this individual who may not be so valuable to society while I'm worrying about my whole group? That sort of distributive ethic, I believe, is wrong. I personally believe it's wrong. It's certainly wrong for me. Just like stepping on that bird was wrong, I know this is wrong.
But then if I tell my patients I'm not going to engage in these insurance products anymore, I'm truly abandoning them. It is a form of abandonment. So I'm now, for the first time at this juncture, I don't know what to do. I don't know what the right thing to do is. It's sort of like the bird, actually, isn't it?
The question, then, is why MR preserves intact the literal events of her experience when reformulating them as metaphor (stepping on a bird), whereas, on the other hand, SW converts experience (loss of technical mastery) into topically differentiated metaphors linked to desired future outcomes (conceptualizing music as a force to be released). Because MR, in large part, defines herself in light of traumas spanning her life, constructing a central metaphor literally reflecting events from 44 years ago provides a palpable sense of narrative continuity to her life story (Schiffrin, 2000) . SW, on the other hand, is not constrained by a series of traumas beyond dystonia, which gives him the "cognitive freedom" to develop metaphors indicating renewed meaning.
Interestingly, however, at the same time that MR's breast cancer and her ensuing professional meaning crisis lead her to develop a central metaphor of sacrifice, the trauma of her illness also marks a starting point for constructing metaphors suggestive of meaning restoration. This is a clear example of how MR is constrained by her past while attempting to reconstruct meaning in her professional life. Let's look at her description of being diagnosed with cancer as a starting point for understanding how this experience sits at the intersection of past-and future-oriented metaphors:
Oh, when I got sick I was 42. I was thin, I looked great, my kids were in good shape, I felt I was a smart doctor, I was well respected, I was doing research-I just felt totally superior. I felt so empowered. I was in the prime of my life. And then, all of a sudden, there I was, and I had a disease, and I was going to die. It was astounding, it was totally shocking-that in the middle of your life you could just go from being this powerful person with this sense that you have control over your life to being dead. So it made me have more of a sense of how just like everybody else I am. I lost a kind of self-esteem called pride.
Second thing I lost was my ambition. I didn't care about money, I didn't care about academic promotion, I didn't care about moving up socially. I cared about nothing except life. It was instantaneous. And it didn't go away. It wasn't like I could be reassured about this cancer.
And I continued not to believe I was going to live for about 7 or 8 years. I'm 10 years out, but I still wouldn't be surprised if it came back. . . . I went through a major existential crisis of astronomic proportions, even worse than when I squashed the bird.
MR then goes on to explain that her "existential crisis" also forced her to clarify her most sacred values. She realized that putting patient concerns above all else, and staying true to this value, is what should be the purpose of her work. Unable to achieve this within the constraints of managed care medicine, however, MR cofounded a nonprofit political advocacy organization with likeminded physicians where she has recently begun to work parttime while still seeing managed care patients. She describes the perspective underlying her new work:
That's why I've been vocal. That's why I've been out there. . . . I started this group [new organization] . . . because I felt like I had to do something. I couldn't just passively sit by and not speak out. And I continue to be one of the few voices that speaks out. Because most doctors are intimidated into silence. . . . They think it's better not to talk about this unseemly business. And they just kind of hope if they duck their heads that maybe it'll all go away.
What are the metaphorical strategies MR uses for developing new professional conceptualizations of herself and, ultimately, a new kind of meaning in her work life? MR draws upon metaphors of "overcoming silence" to represent the formation of a new selfconcept. Note the dramatic contrast of being "vocal," "speaking out," and "not passively sitting by" with the bird metaphor and associated themes of sacrifice, suffering, and, by extension, feeling silenced.
MR's use of speaking-out metaphors (advocacy) occurs synchronously with her use of the bird metaphor (managed care). This metaphorical juxtaposition of contrasting images stems from the fact that she is involved professionally in two very different roles at the same time: managed care physician and advocate. Although MR's advocacy represents the initial stages of reconceptualizing her professional self and the meaning of her work, the very fact that she is in two roles at once accounts, in part, for her orientation to the past and the more circular development of restoring meaning to her work life.
Worldmaking
As we have seen, SW uses worldmaking strategies (weighting and C/D) that are characterized by linearity. The essence of this is the notion that World A (chronologically antecedent) leads to World B (chronologically subsequent). In MR's case, however, she inhabits two worlds simultaneously (practitioner and advocate), which is why it is necessary to conceptualize her worldmaking in a more bidirectional and fluid sense. Although to a certain extent it is true that MR uses what Goodman (1978, p. 14) called deletion and supplementation ("weeding out" or "excising" managed care/ practitioner understandings and "filling in" activist understandings), a more complete view takes into account an ongoing mutual reinforcement between MR's professional realms. On one hand, the conflicting values MR experiences as a managed care physician inform her approach to being an activist (providing the rationale), but on the other hand, her activist work equally influences how she views her role as a practitioner (creating a "dilemma" in need of solving).
Context of Action
SW, as I discussed earlier, establishes a context of action-ritual prayer-that entails the cognitive process of blending prayer with accessing emotion. This results in a new conceptualization of himself as a musician who plays emotionally. Another reason SW chooses prayer as a context of action is that it affords him access to values that accord with his professional goals and the objectives of jazz music writ large.
MR's primary context of action is the advocacy organization she cofounded. This context is also a result of a blending process: Her organization is associated with a distinct set of professional values, which, in turn, generates a new self-concept of MR as a physician who puts patient interests first. But this is a different kind of blending than SW employs, because MR must also conceptualize a context that not only embodies values that match her own but that are also different from the context of managed care medicine. MR takes the cognitive "step" of imagining a new professional role that is not typically associated with being a physician.
The blending process is further complicated because MR is in the paradoxical position of continuing to "play by the rules" of managed care while simultaneously seeking to establish a context with diametrically opposed values. Again, for SW, the process of establishing a context of action is more "straightforward" in the sense that, because he is not cognitively "juggling" two conflicting realms of values, he develops new contexts of action in a more unfettered manner.
CONCLUSION
What are we to make of the meaning restoration processes of SW and MR? On one hand, it is clear that meaning making cannot be understood beyond the context of SW and MR's lives. There is no question that, without reference to the nature of his disease, his conceptualizations of what it means to be a musician, and the larger context of his profession, it would not be possible to make sense of how SW creates meaning in the aftermath of trauma. The same can also be said of MR. The unique life stories, mental representations, and professional backdrops of SW and MR account for important differences in their meaning making.
At the same time, however, underlying the particularistic paths of the two cases are the same root cognitive processes. Despite differences in the actual content of their respective restored professional meanings, SW and MR both rely on the construction of metaphors, worldmaking, and envisioning contexts of action (via blending) as mental operations for carrying out meaning making.
What we are seeing here, then, is what Turner (2001) suggested is a significant benefit of integrating cognitive science perspectives into more established modes of inquiry, such as the case study approach. We preserve the particulars that are associated with different contexts while drawing attention to universal processes. Turner, focusing in particular on the concept of blending, wrote "Man," writes Geertz, in his most famous phrase, "is an animal suspended in webs of significance he has spun" (1973) . Yes, and blending is his main way of spinning them. Blending is to human beings what web-spinning is to spiders. To analyze individual webs, each tailored to its local situation, is of course indispensable and illuminating, but particular, retrospective, local analysis of individual webs should be combined with the study of what makes web-spinning possible, a theory of the nature of web-spinning. Interpretation shows us the web; cognitive study connects past webs to each other and to future webs in its attempt to explain the underlying capacities that make all of those webs possible. (2001, pp. 58-59) As scholars of life-span development suggest (Baltes, 1987; Uttal & Perlmutter, 1989) , meaning is likely to be reformulated throughout a person's life in response to a range of circumstances and events, some of which might be traumatic. Equipped with such a perspective, we can expect that SW and MR will continue to draw upon the general cognitive processes I have discussed to make sense of the particulars of their life stories and live creatively from that new sense. 
